

## LANCASHIRE COMBINED FIRE AUTHORITY

### AUDIT COMMITTEE

Meeting to be held on 23 June 2016

### RISK MANAGEMENT (Appendix 1 refers)

Contact for further information:

Keith Mattinson – Director of Corporate Services– telephone 01772 866804.

#### Executive Summary

The report highlights action taken in respect of corporate risk since these were last reported to the Audit Committee.

#### Decision Required

The Committee is asked to note the actions taken and endorse the revised corporate risk register.

#### Information

The latest review of the corporate risk register has identified two new risks which warrant inclusion on the corporate risk register:-

Failure to maximise the opportunities that technological advances present due to a lack of capacity within the ICT department, and an inability of staff to keep pace with new developments that are implemented.

The following controls are already in place:-

1. ICT Asset Management Plan in place, which identifies replacement timeframes for existing systems;
2. Business Process Improvement Programme (BPIP) consider all new ICT systems/developments, as part of this consideration is given to capacity planning in terms of ICT resource and impact on end users;
3. Corporate Programme Board consider outcomes from BPIP.

Further improvements planned are:-

1. Additional ICT resources identified in 2016/17 budget;
2. Development of social networking site for staff to support each other and share knowledge of ICT systems is planned for 2016/17.

It is proposed that the risk is scored as a medium risk (a score of 12).

Loss of support for Vector Incident Command product with the product name Command Support System (CSS) leading to ineffective management of large incidents (CSS is the software system used on the Mobile Fire Stations/Command Support Units deployed at large scale incidents (6 or more pumps) which allows incident commanders to manage their resources and log critical decisions and map the resources on the incident ground.

The CSS software application we currently run on our command units to manage the incident command system has gone into administration and will no longer be able to support the software system.

The following controls are already in place:-

1. We can still use on each Command unit; there will not be any support should this cease to operate.
2. If that was the case we would need to utilise an alternative means of incident command, i.e. white board and pen.

Further improvements planned are:-

1. Review what other options the market has to offer;
2. Review whether this system can be supported in a different way;
3. Talk to all Vector customs to share any dealings with each other, and look to support each other in any technical issues with existing installs.

It is proposed that the risk is scored as a medium risk (a score of 12).

### Existing Risks

Of the existing risks 3 have been reviewed, and an updated corporate risk register is attached as appendix 1, with changes summarised below:-

		Update since last meeting	Proposed Risk Score	
1	Insufficient resources due to poor funding settlement, inability to make required savings, additional financial pressures such as RDS pensions etc., plus council tax limits via local referendum resulting in Authority being unable to set a balanced budget.	No change, not due to report till 31/3/17	9	Medium
2	Premises Risk Information: That operational staff do not have available adequate and reliable premises information to efficiently resolve operational incidents: Risk information is provided to operational staff based on premises information and premises risk are identified on a continuous basis although this is not consistent throughout the Service.	Previously discharged		

3	Insufficient staffing resources, due to Industrial Action, to deal with operational demand and fulfil statutory responsibilities.	Previously discharged		
4	Lack of availability of water supplies for fire fighting prevents effective fire fighting resulting in additional damage to property and increased risk to life.	Previously discharged		
5	The increasing age profile of operational staff could adversely affect our ability to deliver effective emergency response.	Previously discharged		
6	Operational staff do not have the required skills to operate safely at an incident with the potential to result in F/F injuries or fatalities.	Previously discharged		
7	Failure of key ICT systems resulting in disruption to services	<p>Testing of our Business Continuity plans highlighted a number of areas for improvement, while the plans were complete and would recover the organisation it was felt that their execution placed a lot of pressure on the ICT staff in what might not be their particular area of expertise. To mitigate this all associated documentation has been updated, knowledge transfer is ongoing, and a number of processes have been automated. Further investment into the infrastructure has been identified to improve resilience all with a focus on ease of recovery in the event of an issue.</p> <p>We now have a tiered approach to recovery and the underlying architecture has been re-aligned to support this, services have been separated into categories (essential services, mission critical external (e.g. Gartan), mission critical internal, business critical, business as usual) and would be brought back up in a sequential order each with different recovery objectives.</p>	Remains at 9 pending completion of all action points	Medium

		<p>There were some networking resilience issues that were also brought to light, affecting things like email and telephony - corrective measures have been identified and work is progressing with LCC / BT Lancashire for completion by end of June 2016.</p> <p>Further consideration is being given to relocating some services to NWFC in order to make use of the intrinsic resilience built into the comm's and the building there, as a possible alternative to STC. It would also add further geographical separation to the sites and additional working space for us in the event of an incident.</p>		
8	Loss of corporate reputation through negative publicity.	No change, not due to report till 31/12/16.	9	Medium
9	Retention and recruitment of RDS staff impacts on RDS appliance availability.	Six work streams set up under the RDS Recruitment & Improvement Group specifically aimed at improving the Retained Duty System for personnel. It is anticipated that these work streams will deliver options which will improve appliance availability and retention rates.	Remain at 12	Medium
10	Lack of workforce planning resulting in significant over/under provision of staff and resulting impact on service and finances.	No change, not due to report till 31/3/17.	9	Medium
11	Lack of compliance with legislation resulting in prosecution or compliance order.	Previously discharged.		
12	Ineffective Health and Safety in the workplace, resulting in prosecution, intervention fees etc.	No change, not due to report till 31/12/16.	9	Medium

13	Lack of effective Information management impacting on service delivery and support or leading to a breach of data protection/freedom of information or a loss of sensitive/personal information.	No change, not due to report till 31/12/16.	9	Medium
14	Delayed mobilisation, impacting on service delivery.	No change, not due to report till 31/12/16.	9	Medium
15	High levels of staff absence due to outbreak of ebola.	Previously discharged.		
16	Lack of clarity on future of FRS, leading to inertia.	No change, not due to report till 30/9/16.	9	Medium
17	Failure of ESMCP to deliver a viable communication facility.	No change, not due to report till 30/9/16	9	Medium
18	Inability to maintain service provision in spate conditions.	Comprehensive debrief process undertaken and SMT approved Action Plan agreed: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Revise planning assumptions in LFRS Integrated Risk Management Plan to recognise potential for, and impacts of, wide area flooding in Lancs.</li> <li>• Ensure ESMCP specification recognises communication needs identified.</li> <li>• Refine training for LFRS FDOs regarding National Resilience Asset. mobilisation and associated Command Support and test via exercise.</li> <li>• Refine LFRS vehicle fleet with additional multi-purpose (4x4) vehicles suitable for use in wide area flooding.</li> <li>• Enhance staff PPE with provision of flood suits and provide necessary training to safely operate in type 1 water.</li> </ul>	Remain at 9	Medium

### Financial Implications

None

### **Human Resource Implications**

None

### **Equality and Diversity Implications**

None

### **Environmental Impact**

None

### **Business Risk Implications**

The improvement in risk management arrangements should result in reduced business risk

### **Local Government (Access to Information) Act 1985**

### **List of Background Papers**

Paper	Date	Contact
None		
Reason for inclusion in Part II, if appropriate:		

## CORPORATE RISK REGISTER

Mar 16

	KEY RISKS	RISK MITIGATION/CONTROLS IN PLACE	LIKELIHOOD	IMPACT	RESIDUAL RISK	ACTIONS RECOMMENDED	BY WHEN	BY WHOM	RISK OWNER	DIRECTORATE
1	Insufficient resources due to poor funding settlement, inability to make required savings, additional financial pressures such as RDS pensions etc., plus council tax limits via local referendum resulting in Authority being unable to set a balanced budget.	Local Govt Finance settlement better than anticipated and included indicative figures for 4 years. This was used as a basis for 16/17 budget agreed by FA in Feb 16 and for MTFS presented in same report. Potential funding gap of up to £1.5m identified by 19/20. ECR and other reviews moved back to target implementation in April 2018 to address updated funding gap. The Authority holds significant reserves which will enable it to phase the impact of reductions in funding.	3	3	9	Currently awaiting details to determine whether to sign up to a 4 year settlement to increase funding certainty	31/03/2017	DoCS	DoCS	Corp Serv
2	Premises Risk Information: That operational staff do not have available adequate and reliable premises information to efficiently resolve operational incidents: Risk information is provided to operational staff based on premises information and premises risk are identified on a continuous basis although this is not consistent throughout the Service.	Premises based risks are assessed using the ORA process and paperwork. These are then categorised as level 1, 2, or 3 risk and documented accordingly. RIEF process is in place for sharing risk information The Service now has an ability through its RADAR product to store and record/ amend Cat 2 & 3 risk information. Premises risks categorised as level 2 risk have a hazard statement on the mobilising system. We have assessed the method used to identify premises for assessment and are modifying that method, including audit and review aspects. We have developed, using RADAR, a method to record, store and retrieve.	2	3	6	Discharged				

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<p>3 Insufficient staffing resources, due to Industrial Action, to deal with operational demand and fulfil statutory responsibilities.</p>	<p>LFRS has a separate contingency plan in place that is specific to industrial action. This plan has been utilised throughout the current period of industrial action. Whilst overall levels of cover have been marginally reduced our resilience arrangements have ensured that we have been able to maintain our first pump attendance standards and ensured the same level of professional operational effectiveness throughout each of the periods of industrial action. Appropriate refresher training has been provided.</p> <p>There are 13 &amp; 16 agreements in place with other NW FRSs.</p> <p>Regular dialogue takes place with key staff and representative bodies.</p> <p>In December the FBU announced that further industrial action has been put on hold until June 2017, pending the outcome of the employment tribunals relating to the modifications to the pensions scheme.</p> <p>As such it is proposed that the risk is discharged from the corporate risk register, until such time as the potential for further industrial action arises, i.e. June 2017.</p>	1	4	4	Proposal to discharge				



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<p>4 Lack of availability of water supplies for fire fighting prevents effective fire fighting resulting in additional damage to property and increased risk to life.</p>	<p>The Service commissions, adopts, systematically inspects and repairs mains fed fire fighting hydrants across the County. We maintain operational plans that display the location of available hydrants and open water supplies. Accurate hydrant information now provided to FES. Hydrant inspections moved to a risk based programme. New SSI Hydrant Manager update - Central system (within FES) is now up and running with current information being available on appliance MDT's. Hydrant tech's now moved over to Toughbook's for hydrant management and reporting of defects. We have Strategic Hydrants (those with a flow rate of above 1,500 litres per minute), then Risk Category 1, 2 and 3. Strategic are tested annually, Risk 1 annually, Risk 2 every two years, and Risk 3 every three years. Defects are repaired either in-house by the Hydrant Technicians, or reported to United Utilities (Strategic being marked urgent). Strategic Hydrants are always flow tested and this is recorded on the hydrant asset in SSI. Other hydrants are dry tested Increased use of HVP for larger incidents.</p>	2	3	6	Discharged				

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5	The increasing age profile of operational staff could adversely affect our ability to deliver effective emergency response.	Fitness Assessments introduced and included as part of the Crew Training as of 1st April 14. Remedial action to ensure that acceptable levels of fitness are developed and maintained. Provision of facilities for physical exercise and training on operational stations. Currently staff are timetabled to take a fitness test, are subject to health monitoring and managers can refer staff to OHU if they have concerns. The Service provides a physiotherapy service, critical incident debriefing and counselling if needed.	3	2	6	Discharged				

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<p>6 Operational staff do not have the required skills to operate safely at an incident with the potential to result in F/F injuries or fatalities.</p>	<p>Initial and Continuation training delivery based on National Standards. Role related competencies have been identified and recorded with in Red Kite with appropriate retraining frequencies identified. Initial and Refresher training devised and delivered to cover specialist skills. Risk Critical areas such as Breathing Apparatus are centrally assessed to ensure uniformity. Risks and deficiencies identified from service and nationwide incidents, including Rule 43 Letters result in training delivery where appropriate. Incident Monitoring and REC1 processes in place to identify learning from incidents and inform Crew Refresher training. Operational competence is observed during exercises and training audits. OGBA was formally adopted by LFRS on 1st October 2015 following a comprehensive training program. A review of Incident Command Competence against National Occupational Standards has been completed and a series of training sessions have been introduced , addressing Incident Command and Hazmat competencies. E-learning system introduced, allowing a comprehensive, role related annual training plan to be implemented for all personnel. Ongoing retention of skills is captured within the MOST system and is now an embedded component of LearnPro e-learning modules.</p>	2	3	6	Proposal to discharge				

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7	Failure of key ICT systems resulting in disruption to services.	<p>Separate BCP plans developed, including backup and recovery procedures, desktop exercise completed. Regular assessment of requirements. Asset replacement policy in place, regularly reviewed. IT Firewall to prevent inappropriate access, moisture detection loop installed in SHQ plant room to identify any early threat of flooding Secondary ICT site constructed at STC to provide enhanced resilience providing replicated file data and a means to recover core services to a small number of desktops, implementation of Active Directory to enhance security and control of user access, improved virus protection. Strategy to control use of USB devices implemented. Patch and update policy place to ensure servers and workstations are up to date with latest security developments. Wide Area Network (WAN) to all administrative and operations site. New Storage Area Network (SAN) to replicate all essential servers and data to the disaster recovery site at STC. Installed resilient link from STC to County Hall in order to maintain LCC/OCL supplied services in the event of a failure at SHQ or the link to County and also have extended the network to include the new control facility in Warrington.</p>	3	3	9	<p>Further investment into the infrastructure has been identified to improve resilience all with a focus on ease of recovery in the event of an issue. Networking resilience issues, affecting things like email and telephony, identified and corrective measures being progressed with LCC / BT Lancashire for completion by end of June 2016.</p> <p>Further consideration is being given to relocating some services to NWFC in order to make use of the intrinsic resilience built into the comm's and the building there, as a possible alternative to STC. It would also add further geographical separation to the sites and additional working space for us in the event of an incident</p>	30/06/2017	HoICT	HoICT	Strategy & Planning

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8	Loss of corporate reputation through negative publicity.	<p>Emergency communication plan in place, regularly revised and tested. Effective reactive press office. Proactive media activity to build positive reputation; including on-call arrangements. Scanning and planning function helps anticipate and plan for specific reputational risks. Communication plans include staff communication to reduce risk of 'leaks'. Communication strategy and action plan developed and implemented to support the business continuity arrangements relating to industrial action.</p> <p>Corporate use of social media is now embedded in communication plans with policy and guidance in place. Use across service delivery is increasing and training/guidance should now be integrated to the usual media training packages and extended to all flexi duty staff/watch managers.</p>	3	3	9	The emergency communication plan and supporting toolkit needs to be reviewed to incorporate the new Lancashire Resilience Forum warning and informing plan.	31/12/2016	HoCC	HoCC	People & Development

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9 Retention and recruitment of RDS staff impacts on RDS appliance availability.	RDS recruitment and retention working group established. Increased RDS basic recruits course population from 12 to 24. Quicker access to BA course on completion of recruit training. TOR support throughout the RDS probationary period. Retained salary scheme introduced and reviewed regularly. The service allows shorter RDS contracts to improve appliance availability. Encourages dual contract staff to contribute to the RDS. RDS availability targets now reduced to 95%. Proactive recruitment by SDM's. Joint working between HR and service delivery to enhance current recruitment processes. RDS Workshop held 18/12/15 resulting in recommendation to create an annual RDS Workshop at which priorities will be set for the forthcoming year.	3	4	12	Analysis of availability issues to be undertaken on a Unit by Unit basis by SDMs. Recommend a review/reinvigoration of the RDS Sounding Board Six work streams set up under the RDS RIG specifically aimed at improving the Retained Duty System for personnel. It is anticipate that these work streams will deliver options which will improve appliance availability and retention rates	31/12/2016	HoSD	HoSD	Serv Delivery

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10	Lack of workforce planning resulting in significant over/under provision of staff and resulting impact on service and finances.	Grey book and green book post book developed, establishment and staffing levels agreed with HR, Finance and Managers. Forecast retirement profiles and establishment changes incorporated into this, Forecast over/under provision highlighted, and used to inform decisions on workforce/budget planning/MTFS. Recruitment/selection process in place review of contracts of employment re notice periods. Redeployment process implemented, including developing a staff at risk register and implementing a voluntary redundancy process for green book staff. Regular review of forecasts to ensure staffing resources match requirements. On-going update/review of implementation of workforce implications of reviews undertaken. Grey book recruitment is planned for 2016/17 in order to maintain staffing levels broadly in line with establishment Current green book vacancies are being advertised and filled in the first quarter of the new financial year, which will align staffing levels with establishment	3	3	9	A draft workforce plan has been developed and presented to Resources Committee in March covering the following key areas:- <input type="checkbox"/> Labour demand and forecasting. <input type="checkbox"/> Recruitment, retention and planning. <input type="checkbox"/> Succession planning and talent management. <input type="checkbox"/> Job Design and Multi skilling This will facilitate/enable the regular and comprehensive review of workforce data to support informed decision making. It will also drive the requirements of the project work stream which is considering the functional development of our existing system (i-Trent) to provide the quality workforce data required.	31/03/2017	DoPD	DoPD	People & Development
11	Lack of compliance with legislation resulting in prosecution or compliance order.	Clerk of Authority reviews all Committee reports for legality and advises CFA. Clerk and Solicitor review new legislation. Government notify of all new requirements Horizon scanning.	2	2	4	Discharged.				

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12	Ineffective Health and Safety in the workplace, resulting in prosecution, intervention fees etc.	Health and Safety Management System (HSMS) in place. HSA3 – workplace inspection programme. Internal Audit Framework (replace with SHE Annual Review and Station Audit Programme). HSMS developed and re-certificated to OHSAS 18001 H&S standard. SHE department plan to develop, maintain and continuously improve the HSMS. Publication of risk information – GRA's, service orders etc. External audit and scrutiny through VCA External Auditors, Audit and review arrangements in place through SHE Department audit programme. and VCA surveillance visits (delete duplicates above line). Health, Safety and Environment Advisory Group established (replace with monitor performance).	3	3	9	Continue to monitor and audit process/outcomes.	31/12/2016	HoSHE	HoSHE	People & Development
13	Lack of effective Information management impacting on service delivery and support or leading to a breach of data protection/freedom of information or a loss of sensitive/personal information.	A revised structure to deliver Information Management has been implemented. Nominated Data Protection and Freedom of Information Lead Officers to ensure legal obligations met. All freedom of information requests considered by Exec Board. Performance indicators reported on a regular basis. Location Hub managed centrally allow greater integration of data. performance management software(CORVU) implemented. Data encryption in place.	3	3	9	The Business process and Information programme Board has commissioned work on developing the underpinning policies and strategies needed to create the overarching Information Strategy:- 1. Knowledge Management Strategy. 2. Records Management Strategy. 3. Information Governance Strategy. 4. System Integration Strategy. 5. User Support Strategy. The Project has now completed work on an initial Information Strategy and a number of underpinning policies. There is a road map of work to be undertaken, and the initial phases of this work are now being undertaken	31/12/2016	HoServ Develop	DoSP	Strategy & Planning



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14	Delayed mobilisation, impacting on service delivery.	System uses AVLS to locate the nearest available pump, based on anticipated 'run time'. 2014 saw the implementation of a new Global ITN road speed setting developed from historical evidence provided by Cheshire FRS. This implementation along with changes to Station geographical locations, the removal of road restrictions (imposed on the ITN by the developers) and the development of new response plans has seen an improvement in mobilising with appliances arriving with greater accuracy between the proposed and actual run times. Restrictions have been imposed on the system to ensure non critical incidents are attended by the host station whilst preventing a lengthy run time and/or a slow response time. This restriction ensures both the spread of resources is maintain and the continued use of RDS whilst preventing Whole time appliances being taken out of higher risk areas, this also reduces the need for standby/closing in moves.	3	3	9	Although mobilising accuracy has vastly improved, LFRS have proposed a further change to the Road speed settings based upon evidence gathered; again further improving response accuracy. Data analysis currently being undertaken to confirm the proposed setting with robust testing taking place to ensure this change has no negative effect on any FRS prior to transferring on to the live system.	31/12/2016	HoServ Develop	DoSP	Strategy & Planning
15	High levels of staff absence due to outbreak of Ebola.	On-going liaison with LCC Emergency Planning Dept and LRF. Separate BCP plans developed re large scale staff absence. Enhanced sickness and absence policy implemented. OHU department to provide advice to managers/staff.	1	4	4	Discharged				

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16	Lack of clarity on future of FRS, leading to inertia.	The Sir Ken Knight review highlighted a need to review governance arrangements relating to FRAs. Until such time as further clarity is provided it remains difficult to plan in the long term, hence this risk needs to be reviewed following the outcome of the May elections.	3	3	9	No further clarity has been provided on this issue, although there has been talk about responsibility potentially transferring to PPCs. Until such time as further clarity is provided it is proposed that the risk remains at its current level, and is reviewed as clarity is provided or in 12 month's time.	30/09/2016	CFO	CFO	Exec Board
17	Failure of ESMCP to deliver a viable communication facility.	Emergency Services Mobile Communication Programme (ESMCP) is a national project which will deliver a replacement communications and data service using 4G technology. The new broadband data services will replace the existing private mobile radio system provided by Airwave. Whilst the Programme is in its procurement phase, determining who to award the contract to, the current timescales show the eventual system being rolled out to all Control rooms by January 2017, with the system then being rolled out to individual Fire Services. The current Airwave contract has been extended until 2019, in order to ensure that the roll out of the new system is complete before the existing contact ends. Given how crucial mobile communications are to the Service it is proposed that this is included on the corporate risk register as a medium risk, and is reviewed in 6 month's time.	3	3	9	A regional fire and rescue co-ordinator has been appointed and a plan to work across all five Services in the North West is being produced. Where possible the Services will also collaborate with other Blue Light Services. Information in relation to national timescales, costs and governance has been received. The Service is currently working up its own internal project structure to support the roll out. It should be noted that the North West will be the first region to transition over to ESMCP starting September 2017	30/09/2016	HoServ Develop	DoSP	Strategy & Planning

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18	Inability to maintain service provision in spate conditions	Robust Business Continuity arrangements	3	3	9	<p>Comprehensive debrief process undertaken and SMT approved Action Plan agreed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Revise planning assumptions in LFRS Integrated Risk Management Plan to recognise potential for, and impacts of, wide area flooding in Lancs</li> <li>• Ensure ESMCP specification recognises communication needs identified</li> <li>• Refine training for LFRS FDOs regarding National Resilience Asset mobilisation and associated Command Support and test via exercise</li> <li>• Refine LFRS vehicle fleet with additional multi-purpose (4x4) vehicles suitable for use in wide area flooding</li> <li>• Enhance staff PPE with provision of flood suits and provide necessary training to safely operate in type 1 water</li> </ul>	31/03/2017	HoServ Develop	DoSP	Strategy & Planning
19	Failure to maximise the opportunities that technological advances present due to a lack of capacity within the ICT department, and an inability of staff to keep pace with new development that are implemented	ICT Asset Mgt Plan in place, which identifies replacement timeframes for existing systems BPIP consider all new ICT systems/developments, as part of this consideration is given to capacity planning in terms of ICT resource and impact on end users CPB consider outcomes from BPIP	4	3	12	<p>Additional ICT resources identified in 2016/17 budget</p> <p>Development of social networking site for staff to support each other and share knowledge of ICT systems is planned for 2016/17</p>	31/03/2017	HoICT	DoSP	Strategy & Planning

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20 Loss of support for Vector Incident Command product with the product name Command Support System (CSS) leading to ineffective	The CSS software application we currently run on our command units to manage the incident command system, has gone into administration and will no longer be able to support the software system. However, we can still use on each Command unit, there will not be any support should this cease to operate. If that was the case, we would need to utilise an alternative means of incident command, i.e. white board and pen.	4	3	12	Review what other options the market has to offer or whether this system can be supported in a different way. We will talk to all Vector customs to share any dealings with each other, and look to support each other in any tech issues with existing installs.	31/12/2016	HoServ Develop	DoSP	Strategy & Planning
				<b>20</b>					

HIGH	0
MEDIUM	13
MEDIUM/LOW	4
LOW	3
	<u>20</u>

**Scores**

**Likelihood**

- |   |                             |                              |
|---|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| 5 | Certain, see next sheet     | Minor, see next sheet        |
| 4 | Very Likely, see next sheet | Noticeable, see next sheet   |
| 3 | Likely, see next sheet      | Significant, see next sheet  |
| 2 | Unlikely, see next sheet    | Critical, see next sheet     |
| 1 | Rare, see next sheet        | Catastrophic, see next sheet |